



# **BACKGROUND GUIDE**

**United Nations Security Council**

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# CHMUN'19

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## A LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Jayesh Agarwal  
Chairperson

Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the third session of Choithram School Model United Nations, from September 19 to September 21, 2019.

Dhruvi Nagpal  
Co-Vicechair

Though United Nations Security Council was made to maintain peace around the world, I personally look forward for some internal heated war which can either be in the form of press release, presidential statement or allegations. These conflicts inside the committee may not contribute to the final resolution; however, some fruitful amount will show one's research and awareness towards their country's policies. You may also expect a crisis on the final day just to end the committee with Wikipedia-free content.

Aditya Khandelwal  
Co-Vicechair

I am so excited for you to join us in CHMUN. I look forward to seeing your research come to life through committee debate, working paper, and draft resolutions. Best of luck with your preparation efforts, and please reach out to me with any questions. I cannot wait to see all of you in the conference.

Sincerely,

Jayesh Agarwal  
Chairperson  
United Nations Security Council  
jayesh.agarwal9@gmail.com



## Committee Expectations

Before we get into the substance of the committee, I want to describe my vision for this committee and how I expect the committee to function, although, of course, advice from delegates is welcome. I do not plan to interfere in the working of committee—it will be driven by the delegates. However, I may make suggestions from time to time to direct the flow of committee. For example, if there is a crisis break and the committee continues to discuss an unrelated or less important part of the topics, I might ask for discussion on the crisis. I would like to see a large amount of substantive debate on the topics and the crises. Please be mindful of the nature of the topics and avoid being insensitive, regardless of your country's position, since these are real issues affecting real people today. I expect delegates to be well researched on the intricacies of the topics and on country positions, and I expect that substantive preparation to be reflected in crisis notes and speeches. Since I am very invested in these topics, I want to hear well-constructed arguments from delegates, especially from those defending controversial country positions. I hope to keep committee very fast-paced with constant crisis updates. While I expect superb crisis note writing, I also expect stirring debate on the crisis and its implications, beyond just condemnation and expressions of disapproval. Keep in mind, especially when writing directives, that all international institutions have specific mandates beyond which they cannot act. Also remember that while your country may not have the same capabilities as others, you will NOT be at a disadvantage. Your resources may be limited but your creativity is not. The crisis staff will ensure that they take into account your country's capabilities and will be open to accepting more creative ideas.

I want to especially stress the importance of diplomacy. You should behave as actual delegates in the UNSC would. Your actions

and speeches should show an understanding of the issues as well as a willingness and ability to work with other delegates. A willingness to compromise will be looked upon favorably if it benefits committee and/or the situation at hand. I cannot emphasize the importance of being polite in your interactions with other delegates and with the staff enough.

If you have any questions about how committee will work or if you have any suggestions, please don't hesitate to reach out.

## Introduction to the Committee and Guide

The United Nations Security Council promises to be the most fast-paced and engaging committee at CHMUN. Combining a focus on real world conflicts and issues with elements of crisis,

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this committee allows for important discussions that college students need to be having while encouraging them to err on the side of crazy through creative crisis notes. You will be sparring not just with the other delegates but also with members of the dais who fully intend to hit you with crisis after crisis to keep you on your feet.

The two topics we have chosen for this committee are designed to provide for engaging debate and solution-heavy argumentation. This guide will cover important information on how the conflicts came to be but you are encouraged to read more on each of the topics because additional knowledge on these issues will help you in committee and beyond. This background guide traces the history of these conflicts and major developments. It explores the Sino-Indian border dispute and traces the history of this dispute, including claims and arguments from both sides. This conflict can be divided into three regions- a dispute over the Aksai Chin region in the west, over states near the India-China-Nepal trijunction in the middle, and over the McMahon line and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the east. We begin with the colonial period and look at Britain's involvement in the dispute. Following that all the way up to independence, we then look at post-independence relations between India and China and how the border dispute has complicated them. For this topic, I urge you to focus on legal arguments since that is (ideally) how border disputes are settled. The guide, however, also describes the reality on the ground because that is very different from what the maps say. The purpose of this committee and this guide is to start conversations. The topic is tough and nuanced and involves a greater understanding of the history and laws of the involved nations than ordinary Model UN committees. This guide aims to ease

your burden, but much is left to explore. I hope it helps. Good luck with research! Please don't hesitate to reach out if have any questions or stop me in the hallway if you want to discuss the topics- that's exactly what I'm hoping for.

## The United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council is one of the six main organs of the UN. It is tasked with

the maintenance of international peace and security and is perhaps the most important decision-making body of all international institutions. It is the only organ of the UN which has the power to pass binding resolutions and impose obligations on the Member States of the UN. The Council has five permanent members and ten elected members. It meets regularly to address any threats to international peace and security. It has, in the past, addressed issues that range from terrorism and civil wars to national disasters. Although subjected to much criticism, the structure of the UNSC has largely remained unchanged since it was founded. It has five permanent members- China, France, Russia, UK, and USA. The permanent members, collectively known as the P5, have this privileged status as a result of their victory in the Second World War, which was a large factor in the creation of the United Nations. The five permanent members of the UNSC wield veto power, which means if any one of them votes against a resolution, the resolution automatically fails. Although China was initially represented by the Republic of China (referred to as Taiwan), it is now represented by the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union held a permanent seat and this seat was taken over by the Russian Federation as the successor state of the USSR.



United Nations Security Council

Counting the years when the USSR held the seat, Russia has used the veto most frequently. While the US has the second highest frequency, China has been using the veto with increasing frequency recently. The other ten members are elected by a two-thirds vote of the UN General Assembly and serve two-year terms. The most important criterion on which this election is based is the country's contribution to the

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maintenance of international peace and security. This includes financial contributions, troop contributions, and displays of leadership on regional issues. Another consideration is equitable geographical distribution which led to regional groups being allotted seats. The Asia-Pacific group has two seats, the African group has three seats, the Latin American and Caribbean Group has two, the Western Europe and Others group has two, and the Eastern European group has one.

The functions of the UNSC include determining the existence of a threat to global peace, ordering adversarial parties to settle disputes peacefully by recommending courses of action and/or terms

of settlement, imposing sanctions on countries to force their hand, authorizing the use of force, and recommending measures to the UN General Assembly and other organs of the UN. The UNSC is supported by subsidiary organs which carry out its work. This includes ad hoc committees such as those on sanctions and nuclear weapons, or international criminal tribunals such as those for Rwanda. The UN Secretariat also helps it carry out its mandate, especially through the Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support. The UNSC has been criticized on many grounds. Many argue that the seat distribution reflects a power structure which no longer holds. The veto power frustrates the immense power of the body and makes it subject to the political interests of the P5 which leads to inaction in concerning areas such as Syria. Peacekeeping operations are criticized not just for their cost and unduly large scope but also because peacekeepers themselves have been accused of abuse in multiple cases. Change is, however, unlikely since an amendment of the UN Charter requires an affirmative vote and domestic ratification by two thirds of Member States, including all P5 members who are unlikely to want to reduce their own influence. Many states like Brazil and India are vying for permanent seats themselves, while smaller countries are advocating for greater transparency and enlargement of the body, which would come at the cost of efficiency.

## Sino-Indian Border Dispute

We will now delve into the Sino-Indian border dispute. While this conflict has emerged fairly recently, it has the potential to destabilize possibly the most powerful region in the world today—Asia. Involving the two largest countries in terms of population, who are also nuclear powers, this conflict could easily devolve into a global crisis. In order to understand the legal arguments presented by both sides and the strategic importance of these border regions to both countries, we will first explore the history and geography of this conflict.

### History of Sino-Indian Border Dispute

China is India's largest neighbor and they share a border of approximately 3380 km. Relations between the two countries have always been less than cordial, much of it a reaction to the border dispute over a land area of over 125,000 square km. The dispute can be divided into three sections- east, middle, and west-

, involving areas of 125,000 square kilometers, 2,000 square kilometers, and 33,500 square kilometers respectively.

The western section starts with the Karakoram mountain pass in the north to the Ngari Prefecture-La dwags-Himachal Pradesh intersection. This disputed area is known as the Aksai Chin region (meaning a 'desert of white stones') and is currently controlled by China. The dispute in the West pertains to the border between the Indian state of Jammu

and Kashmir and the Chinese territories of Xinjiang and Tibet. All three of these regions have proved troublesome to the host state with each of them continuing to have strong separatist sentiments. The Sino-Indian border west of the Karakoram Pass has become the Sino-Pakistani border ever since Pakistan took over large parts of Kashmir in 1947-48, which it now calls Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or Azad Kashmir. It was formally delimited by the Sino- Pakistani border agreement in 1963, which further complicates matters.

In the middle section, the dispute is over the land which stretches from the Ngari Prefecture-La dwags-Punjab junction in the west to the India-China-Nepal junction in the east. This is a significantly smaller land area than in the eastern section. This encompasses areas of the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, as well as pilgrimage

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routes to Hindu places of worship near Lake Mansrover and Mount Kailash.

In the east, it is the McMahon Line which is under scrutiny. This line starts from the India-China-Bhutan intersection in the west and goes up to the Brahmaputra River in the east. It comprises mostly the territory of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which has a population of over a million people.

## Western Sector

India's claim to the eastern region is based on the Johnson Line which was drawn in the 19th century. When Great Britain colonized Kashmir in 1846, it wanted to use Kashmir as the base to defend the northern frontiers of the empire. To protect these border claims, W.H. Johnson who worked with the Survey of India drew up the 'Johnson Line' in 1965 and placed Aksai Chin in Kashmir. Aksai Chin is a strategic point for the Chinese, despite being an uninhabited and barren plateau, because it is a passage point between Tibet and the Xinjiang province. When India was firmly under British rule, it began to push the border forward into the Chinese side.

In 1896, a British agent in Kashgar was recorded saying that "Aksai Chin was a general name for an ill-defined and very elevated table land at the north-east of Ladakh and it was probably the case that part was in Chinese and part in British territory." This shows that although the British were anxious to formally demarcate India's borders with Afghanistan and Russia, it placed very little importance on its borders with China. At a meeting of the Russian, Chinese, and British Empires in the Pamirs, there were conflicting claims about territory in south Asia, especially the Kanjut region (north of today's Jammu and Kashmir). This resulted in the British suggesting a mutual delimitation of the Sino-Kashmir border to the Chinese. British Colonel C.M. MacDonald addressed a letter to Prince Ch'ing and his ministers on March 14, 1889. The text of the letter included:

"It is now proposed by the Indian Government that for the sake of avoiding any dispute or uncertainty in the future a clear understanding should be come to with the Chinese Government as to the frontier between the two States. To obtain this

clear understanding it is necessary that China should relinquish her shadowy claim to suzerainty over the state of Kanjut. The Indian Government on the other hand will on behalf of Kanjut relinquish her claims to most of the Tagdumbash and Raskam districts. It will not be necessary to mark out the frontier. The natural frontier is the crest of a range of mighty mountains

a great part of which is quite inaccessible. It will be sufficient if the two Governments will enter into an agreement to recognize the frontier as laid down by its clearly marked geographical features." Although the Chinese never responded to this letter, it is of significance in that it provides the British version. And the fact that this is one of the few documented sources of delineation shows that the British found the Sino-Kashmir frontier to be of little importance, not worthy of the deliberations of imperial statesmen. As a result, maps made by the British during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were inaccurate and contradicted each other. Even as late as 1909, the Imperial Gazetteer of India drew the border to the west of the Karakoram Pass and north of the line that India got from the British in 1947. The importance of MacDonald's letter has been underestimated by historians. At border talks, both Chinese and Indian delegations referred to this letter and used it to further their own purposes. The Indian delegates would slightly alter the provisions of the letter, which did not change the eastern boundary of Ladakh from being the spur running south from the Kunlun range, as indicated by earlier British maps. The Indians instead said that it was the Kunlun range itself which the British described as being the northern border. Indian representatives would state that, in the letter, the British described the northern Kashmiri border with Sinkiang as running along the Kunlun range up to a point east of 800 longitude where it the Ladakh's eastern boundary.

The Chinese could have used the details of the letter as a weapon- the British would likely have considered the argument valid because the contents of the letter had been sanctioned- but they limited themselves to the argument that in 1899 India had proposed the boundaries between Sinkiang and Tibet, but they had not been accepted by the Chinese government.

Since then, China's case remained based on the claim that the border was never delimited and that unilateral delimitations by imperial powers would not be considered valid by national governments. For



example, in the ‘Sino-Indian Boundary Question’, published in 1962 by the Foreign Languages Press in Peking, the letter is discussed as such: “The British Government proposed in 1899 to delimit the boundary between Ladakh and Kashmir on the one hand and Sinkiang on the other, but nothing came of it. It is also inconceivable to hold that the territory of another country can be annexed by a unilateral proposal.” It is worth remembering that the line in the letter only included approximately half of Beijing’s then claim in the Aksai Chin. However, their half-hearted efforts in using historical data to further their argument looked pale in comparison to India’s meticulous care in preparing arguments grounded in historical data and documentation. China seemed to be of the opinion that physical presence in the disputed areas was far more important and made a stronger case than an historical data. Tensions rose in the west when China undertook massive projects for road construction to support its presence in Tibet. One of the most important projects was the conversion of the old caravan route to Aksai Chin from Xinjiang into a motorable road. This project was begun in 1953 and was completed in September 1957. Prime Minister Nehru heard of this news, it is said, through a Chinese newspaper, and he sent two reconnaissance missions to Aksai Chin, one of which was taken into custody by Chinese patrols in the area. Nehru finally felt like he had to make a stand and sent a memo to the Chinese government, officially claiming the Aksai Chin region as Indian territory. He wrote, “There can be no question of these large parts of India [shown as within China on the Chinese map] being anything but India and there is no dispute about it.” Zhou en Lai responded to this in January 1959 with perhaps the first clear enunciation of the Chinese policy. He said that although the borders between the two countries had never been formally demarcated there were no border disputes between India and China, as Nehru seemed to be implying. His letter also stated that the Aksai Chin was Chinese territory and had always been under the jurisdiction of China. It added that although China considered the McMahon line to be illegal, China would consider accepting the McMahon line if India waived or greatly modified its claim to the Aksai Chin. These claims were outrightly rejected by Nehru, who felt insecure and decided to send Indian troops into all

the disputed territories claimed by India. In October 1959, Indian troops tried to establish their posts near the Lanak Pass. To do so, they tried to cross the Kongka Pass and this resulted in a military clash with the Chinese troops posted there. Nine Indians died and ten were taken prisoner, while the Chinese only lost one. Following the showdown at the Kongka Pass, Zhou en Lai decided to visit India to put an end to the dispute peacefully through negotiations. During these negotiations, Zhou proposed the reciprocal acceptance of the realities on ground of Indian or Chinese presence, and the setting up of a boundary commission to fix the borders once and for all. India, however, rejected this and said that it would accept no compromise, no negotiations, and no standstill agreement. After these failed discussions, China began to step up its military forces in the disputed zones through the setting up of check-posts and border patrols.



Map of disputed regions

## Middle Sector

The dispute in the middle sector is the least contentious by far. It comprises the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The length of the border between Himachal Pradesh and Tibet is approximately 300 kilometers and are in the districts of Kinnaur and Lahul. The length of the border between Uttar Pradesh and Tibet is approximately 400 kilometers and contains the famous passes of Kungri, Lipu Lekh and Neet. This region is important for two reasons. Uttar Pradesh is the most populous Indian state and is thus perhaps the most important, electorally speaking. It has the highest number of seats in the India Parliament, which allots

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seats based on the population of the state. This is a major battleground of Indian domestic politics.

Chinese interference would greatly affect the internal politics of the country, which is why anti-China and anti-Pakistan rhetoric abounds in this state.

Moreover, this region has a number of pilgrimage routes to holy places in the Hindu religion. Although there has never been any major row over this sector, China has occasionally accused India of occupying parts of their territory and illegally expanding its territory since the 1950s, referring specifically to the Nagari prefecture of Tibet, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. The total disputed area is around two thousand square kilometers. This sector is the only one on which the Chinese and Indians have shared maps with each other on which they both agree. It has seen only a few minor incidents such as invasions of airspace.

Dharamshala, where the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile have been given asylum since the 1959 Tibetan uprising against the Chinese, lies in Himachal Pradesh. Their presence has been a constant strain on Sino-Indian relations.

## Eastern Sector

In 1913-14, a tripartite conference was held between Sir Henry McMahon who was at the time foreign secretary of the British Indian government, a delegate of Tibet, and a representative of the federal Chinese government, and drafted the Shimla Accord. On the sidelines of this conference, McMahon met with the Tibetan delegate and signed a bilateral agreement on a border known as the McMahon line. The Chinese government rejected this border and the Accord and later the government of Tibet disputed it as well.

The British government, however, began to use the McMahon Line in Survey of India maps in 1937 and published the line in the Shimla Accord which was released the following year. The British continued to push forward and expand control towards the McMahon Line, especially taking advantage of China's weakness during the Second World War. When India finally won her independence in August 1947, the McMahon Line had become very much a part of India's border in the northeast and the new government accepted the inherited border as the legitimate border.

In 1951, the People's Republic of China took control

of Tibet, bringing them even closer to India and provoking the Indian government to try to assert their control, both administrative and military, in the east. India also occupied Tawang, which was an important Buddhist site and the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. The Tibetan government was furious and protested, but the Chinese government said nothing on the issue. This silence was interpreted as China's willingness to accept the legitimacy of the McMahon Line. Although there was no talk of the border dispute, both India and China had started building roads and infrastructure and sending out survey teams to the region. In 1954, India and China signed an agreement which included their 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence':

- Mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity
- Mutual non-aggression
- Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
- Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit
- Peaceful coexistence

The agreement also included provisions on Tibet. India surrendered some of its rights in Tibet and China refrained from discussing the border issue, which India perceived as a recognition of the fact that there was no border dispute. Nehru even made an announcement that he was glad that the borders had been drawn and that there should be no further disputes. He ordered the setting up of a system of checks and posts along the entire border and after cementing their geopolitical position, India tried to modify some sections of the McMahon Line by pushing them further into China in the north. This culminated in the first clash between the Chinese and Indian armies in 1959. In August, the Chinese army captured an Indian patrol at Longju, which they believed to be north of the McMahon Line but which India claimed laid directly on the line. In October of that year, there was a military showdown near the Kongka Pass in the Aksai Chin region in which nine Indian police officers were killed. The Indian Army was not ready for war at the time and decided to withdraw patrols from those disputed areas.

## Sino-Indian War of 1962

While the world was occupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, Chinese forces invaded India with no warning. Since the independence of India and the formation of the People's Republic of China, India had tried to maintain cordial relations with China and made concessions to do so. When China announced its occupation of Tibet, India asked for negotiations but did not press the issue despite it being a tremendous concern. It even showed its solidarity with China and did not attend the conference which concluded the Treaty of San Francisco between the Allied Powers and Japan because China had not been invited to it. In 1954, the two countries concluded their 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' and India acknowledged China's hold over Tibet. A common refrain in India was "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" which translates to "the Indians and the Chinese are brothers."

Problems started with the beginning of the Tibetan Uprising in 1959. Fearing for his life, in March the Dalai Lama fled to India. Nehru agreed to take him in and he set up the Government of Tibet in exile in Dharamshala, India. Mao was extremely unhappy with India's willingness to grant him asylum and began to blame India for causing and promoting the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet. China began to perceive India as a threat to its control over Tibet and that became one of the main reasons for the 1962 war. From that point forward, border clashes broke out frequently along the disputed borders. In October 1959, Indian forces tried to cross the Kongka Pass and set up posts on the Lanak Pass. They were stopped by Chinese patrols posted in Kongka and a fight ensued. In 1961, Nehru instituted his 'Forward Policy' which sought to create border outposts and establish patrols in areas claimed by the Chinese (north of Chinese positions) and tried to cut off Chinese supply lines. The Chinese began to do the reverse and flank the Indians. The Forward Policy has been criticized by many historians because, they argue, that this would be viewed as hostile by the Chinese and increase the chances of conflict, and that the Indian Army was not ready for it.

Military clashes continued in 1962 but increased in intensity. In June, a skirmish led to the death of twenty Chinese soldiers. In July, over 350 Chinese troops surrounded the Indian post at Chushul and

chanting that the Gurkhas should not fight for India over loudspeakers. Zhou Enlai personally assured Nehru that China did not want a war with India but privately ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to aggregate along the border. On October 10, 1962, the first heavy clash occurred and led to the death of over thirty Chinese soldiers and twenty-five Indian soldiers.

The full-scale invasion began on October 20 when the PLA invaded India in a two-pronged attack- one in Ladakh and one across the McMahon Line into the then North-East Frontier Agency (today's Arunachal Pradesh). Confident that China would not start a war, India had made little military preparations and had deployed only two divisions of its troops in the region. Within two days, the Chinese had seized almost the entirety of the Aksai Chin region. By October 24, PLA forces were ten miles south of the Line of Control and Zhou ordered them to hold their positions while he sent a proposal to Nehru during a cessation of the fighting. His letter proposed:

- Negotiations for the final settlement of the boundary
- Disengagement of troops from both sides and a withdrawal by 12.4 miles (20 km) from the lines of present control (i.e. their current positions)
- Chinese withdrawal to the north of the North East Frontier Agency
- That the two countries accept the lines of present control in the Aksai Chin

Nehru replied on October 27 and asked for a return to the boundaries of September 8, 1962. He also wanted a larger buffer zone to prevent such an attack in the future and asserted that a withdrawal by twenty km was not enough after "40 or 60 kilometers of blatant military aggression." On November 4, Zhou replied and offered to return to the MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin and the McMahon Line in NEFA. The Indian Parliament was upset by this invasion and blamed it on Nehru. It declared a national emergency and passed a bill calling for China to be "[driven] from the sacred soil of India." Facing great public pressure and receiving little to no help from India's ally the Soviet Union which was occupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nehru rejected the second offer as well and resumed the war

## Sino-Indian Relations Since 1962

on November 14 with an Indian attack on Chinese forces at Walong. The PLA resumed operations within hours, attacking Bomdi La and capturing Thembang within a few days. The Chinese cut Indian communications lines so that they couldn't contact headquarters. In the west, the PLA attacked Chushul, Gurung Hill, and Rezang La, which had been held by Indian troops. The Indian troops were inadequately armed and their light gun machines were no match for Chinese weapons. China had reached the line they claimed and Indian troops had been ordered to withdraw, so the fighting stopped. On November 19, China declared a unilateral ceasefire. The declaration stated:



Indian troops in the 1962 War

“Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control.”

The war led to the death of 1383 Indian and 722 Chinese troops, many of whom were killed by the harsh conditions of the mountainous terrain. Nehru was heavily criticized for his pacifism and the army was humiliated because of its lack of preparation. Soon after, the armed forces began to upgrade its weaponry and beef itself up, which would be of use in the war against Pakistan just three years later.

The war changed Indian foreign policy, making them much more wary in their interactions with neighbors and beefing up security forces, which helped them defeat Pakistan in the 1965 war and participate in the liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in the 1971 war. It radically changed its China policy, unable to understand or come to terms with the sudden invasion and just as sudden withdrawal. China had been the only nuclear power in Asia and when it tested nuclear devices in 1964, it created panic in India. India began to accelerate investment in its own nuclear capabilities and conducted its first successful nuclear bomb test on May 18, 1974. Although this is generally attributed to deterring Pakistan, this rapid development of nuclear power by India was as much motivated by the threat they perceived from China, evidenced by the fact that most of the groundwork for India's nuclear testing was initiated only after the 1962 war.

Relations with Russia further complicated matters, particularly as the Cold War started heating up. The Sino-Soviet split occurred in the 1960s, while India began to grow closer to the USSR, signing a

Friendship Treaty with the USSR in 1971. With ping pong diplomacy between the Chinese and the US taking off, Pakistan worked behind the scenes to help normalize relations between the two. This resulted in much closer ties between Pakistan and China - India's worst nightmare. China even provided economic aid and military assistance, albeit not a large amount,

to Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. It even threatened to open a second front against India on the Assam border in 1965. India, in response, tried to grow even closer to the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet split even affected domestic politics in India. The Communist Party of India has always been a strong political player, but the rift between the Soviet Union and China caused a split in the party, with the party itself remaining pro-

Soviet, but the breakaway Communist Party of India (Marxist) being pro-Chinese. This split continues to this day.

India began to make overtures towards China in 1969 and restored diplomatic ties in 1976. These talks had been in jeopardy after Sikkim, which was a protectorate of India and shared a border with Tibet, voted to abolish the monarchy and acceded to

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India as the twenty-second state of the Indian Union. However, Deng Xiaoping in China was trying to improve relations and pushed to not let this stand in the way. For their part, the Indians decided to forgo the agreement China signed the same year with Pakistan on nuclear cooperation. The 2003 Sino-Indian Memorandum settled the Sikkim question because it acted as a de-facto acceptance of Sikkim's accession by China. Chinese maps now show Sikkim as an Indian state and the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs deleted it from its list of Chinese border countries and regions. The northernmost point of the Sikkim-China border, 'The Finger', however, continues to be disputed, although Wen Jiabao, then Chinese Prime Minister, said in 2005 that Sikkim was no longer part of the problem between the two countries.

India had been ruled by the Indian National Congress party since independence. In 1977, India saw its first non-Congress government- the Janata Party. The Janata Party took a different approach in its foreign policy and was more committed to the Non-Aligned Movement than the Congress, although it still leaned towards the Soviet Union. In China, when Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he began to follow a policy of building up China internally and disentangling it from international conflicts. In 1978, his government declared that they would no longer support any insurgent movements in the northeastern states of India. Deng even suggested that China would acknowledge Indian control over NEFA if India gave up its claims in the Aksai Chin region. The Janata Party's foreign minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in 1979. But relations were by no means cordial. A dialogue was initiated in 1981 on the border issue. Between 1981 and 1987, eight vice foreign-ministers' meetings were held. These meetings, however, quickly went south and resulted in military clashes in 1986- 87 at Sumdurong Chu in the eastern sector. In 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China.

His idea was that the resolution of the border dispute did not need to be the condition for increasing relations between the two countries and pushed forward new agreements for economic cooperation. In 1993 and 1996, two agreements were signed dealing with the line of actual control ("LAC"). The 1996 agreements contain the following provision, which gave the term LAC legal recognition: "No

activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control." The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, however, contains one important provision: "The two sides agree that references to the line of actual control in this agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question." Between 1989 and 2005, fifteen vice-ministerial working group meetings were held, despite the tension caused by India's nuclear tests in May 1998.

The US government leaked a letter from Indian Prime

Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in which he wrote that the nuclear tests were justified because of the threat posed by China's nuclear arsenal and the fact that they were providing Pakistan with nuclear assistance. The new friendship was tested by the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. China promised neutrality and delivered it. Since then, China's statements on the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan have stressed the need for both sides to compromise. Sino-Indian economic ties have also grown tremendously over the last few years, increasing from just \$117 million in 1987 to \$84.4 billion in 2011.

Although there has been no major military conflict since 1962, tensions continue to flare up in the region and it has taken more of a political dimension. In 2007, China refused to grant a visa to a citizen of Arunachal Pradesh who was trying to visit as part of an official Indian delegation, arguing that he was in fact a Chinese citizen since Arunachal Pradesh is part of their claim. An angry Indian government cancelled the whole trip in retaliation. In 2009, the Asian Development Bank gave India grants for projects specifically in Arunachal Pradesh. This angered China and used its leverage in the bank to remove all references to Arunachal Pradesh in the grant. In recent years, Chinese policy has changed to claim all of Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory, and they have stationed 400,000 troops of the People's Liberation Army near the border. India has upped its troop presence but nowhere near that level. China has been developing closer ties with Pakistan, being its largest supplier of military goods and its only supplier of nuclear technology. China has also stationed about 3,000 troops in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (a part of Kashmir claimed by India but administered by Pakistan since it occupied the region

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in the 1948 war with India). India continues to house the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala, which China is still not happy about. China has consistently opposed India's ambitions to become a member of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only P5 member to oppose India's bid. Chinese and Indian naval buildup in the Indian Ocean has alarmed some scholars who claim that the ocean will be the next theatre of war between the two.

In 2013, tensions escalated when India claimed that Chinese troops had crossed the Line of Actual Control and established a camp in Daulat Beg Oldi, nineteen km into Indian territory, and entered Indian airspace to drop supplies to their forces. Chinese officials denied the incident and both sides placed troops facing each other but decided to retreat within a few weeks in May. In September 2014, India began constructing a canal in Demchok, a village near the border. Chinese civilians protested and both armies were ready to square off but agreed to withdraw within a few weeks. The Chinese started building a watchtower in the Burtse region in the north of Ladakh despite Indian protests that it was much too close to the agreed patrol line. In September 2015, Indian troops began dismantling the tower and engaged in a clash with the Chinese army.

In 2017, there was a military clash between the PLA and the Indian army at Doklam, a village near the India-China-Bhutan trijunction in Sikkim. In June 2017, Chinese forces accompanied construction vehicles and began construction of a road in Doklam. On June 18, Indian armed forces arrived with bulldozers (and weapons) to halt the construction. The armies were facing off and politicians on both sides had begun posturing. After months, on August 28, both sides announced that all their troops had retreated from the site. The conflict at Doklam has led to a resumption of the rhetoric employed by both sides on the conflict. Official Chinese media outlets and think tanks issued warnings to India that if it did not back down, there could be war. They brought up the 1962 war and asserted that India should learn from its past experience. In response to this, Indian Defense and Finance Minister Arun Jaitley said,

“The India of 2017 is very different from the India of 1962.” India's Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, said that a Sino-Indian war was possible and that the Indian Army is “fully ready for a two and a

half front war.” The Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, did not rule out the possibility of this dispute escalating when asked about it at a press conference.

### Humanitarian Aspect

The disputed regions have seen gross violations of human rights. The Indian Army operates in the northeastern states (including parts of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam) and in Jammu and Kashmir under the provisions of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. The AFSPA gives the armed forces the power to maintain public order in “disturbed areas” through the use of otherwise impermissible actions. They may prohibit public gatherings and use force to dispel such gatherings. They may arrest without warrants, enter and search premises, and they have legal immunity for their actions. The AFSPA has given cover to Indian troops which have committed major human rights abuses, including unlawful detention, murder and rape.

China, too, has committed human rights violations, particularly in the Aksai Chin and Tibet border regions. They have taken dozens of political prisoners, subjecting them to torture and even the death penalty, undertaken forced abortions and sterilization. Freedom of religion is nonexistent and the central leadership's control over the media makes it difficult to determine the extent of human rights abuses.



Humanitarian protests in India

## Recent Timeline of the Dispute

- 1 January 1950: India becomes the first non-communist country to recognize the People's Republic of China after its creation in October.
- 7 October 1950: Chinese troops cross the border and move towards Lhasa, Tibet, paving the way for the annexation of Tibet.
- 23 May 1951: China forces the Tibetan government to sign the Seventeen Point Agreement, which authorizes the rule of the Chinese government and the presence of PLA troops in Tibet, effectively placing Tibet under Chinese suzerainty.
- 15 May 1954: India and China sign the Panchsheel document on the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence.
- 1 April 1955: India signs a protocol in Lhasa and hands over control of communication services in Tibet to China.
- 18 December 1956: A diplomatic row breaks out when Chinese civilians who crossed into Ladakh were detained by India and later sent back to China.
- 4 September 1958: India protests the inclusion of a large area of the North-Eastern Frontier Agency
- 17 March 1959: The Dalai Lama flees Tibet, fearing for his safety during the 1959 Tibetan Uprising. He crosses the border into Indian territory and requests asylum in India. The Indian government grants him asylum and allows him to set up a Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala.
- 8 September 1959: Zhou En Lai refuses to accept the McMahon Line, arguing that China was not a signatory to the 1842 Peace Treaty between England and India. He laid claims to 50,000 km<sup>2</sup> of Indian territory in Sikkim and 40,000 km<sup>2</sup> of Indian territory in the North Eastern Frontier Agency and Ladakh.
- 20 October 1962: The Chinese People's Liberation Army attacks India and invades on two fronts- across the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and Ladakh in the western sector. This begins the Sino-Indian War of 1962.
- 21 November 1962: The unilateral Chinese ceasefire comes into effect, after Chinese forces have taken over all their claimed regions. The 1962 war ends, with India accusing China of illegally occupying over 30,000 square kilometers of Indian territory.
- 11 September 1967: The People's Liberation Army launches an attack on the Indian posts at Nathu La, along the border of the Kingdom of Sikkim (which is an Indian protectorate at this time) and clashes with Indian forces. Another clash occurs a few days later at Cho La. Indian forces inflict decisive defeats on the Chinese, driving Chinese forces back and destroying PLA fortifications.
- 14 April 1975: In a referendum, 97.55 percent of voters in the Kingdom of Sikkim vote to abolish the monarchy. Accession talks are initiated with India and Sikkim becomes a state in the Indian Union. China expresses strong disapproval of and indignation at this merger,
- 24 July 1976: There is a resumption of diplomatic ties between China and India for the first time since the 1962 war. They agree to restore diplomatic presence in the countries and send ambassadors.
- 19 December 1988: Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits China, the first visit by an Indian prime minister to the country in over thirty years. He concludes an agreement that sets up a working group to settle the boundary question.
- 7 September 1993: India and China sign the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. They agree to reduce troop levels in the disputed territories and notify each other of troop movements. They agree on these temporary security measures but conclude that the final decision is yet to be made on border demarcation.
- 28 November 1996: Jiang Zemin, President of China, visits India and is the first Chinese head of state to visit the country. India and China sign an Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. It provides for border security measures and for full disclosure on troop movements.
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- 23 June 2003: Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visits China to strengthen bilateral relations. He is the first Indian head of government to visit China in over a decade.
- 25 June 2003: Chinese President Hu Jintao and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee make a historic announcement. China agreed to open trade with India through the state of Sikkim, implicitly recognizing India's sovereignty over the state. In return, India recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China.
- 9 April 2005: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits India ostensibly to discuss cooperation in the field of high-technology industries. He also signs an agreement which aimed at resolving the border dispute over the border near the eastern Himalayas.
- 6 July 2006: The Nathu La Pass is reopened by both sides for the first time since the 1962 war. This reopening was meant to bolster the economy of the region and Sino-Indian trade.
- 25 May 2007: China denies a visa to an Indian official from Arunachal Pradesh, arguing that because the state is a part of China he is already a Chinese citizen and does not need a visa to enter his own country.
- 13 October 2009: India and China become embroiled in a dispute over Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh. China expresses "strong dissatisfaction" on the visit to the "disputed area." India responds by saying Arunachal Pradesh is an "integral and inalienable" part of India.
- 27 August 2010: India cancels defense exchanges with China after an Indian army officer is denied a visa because he controlled a disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir. In retaliation, India refuses to allow two Chinese defense officials to visit India.
- 18 June 2017: Chinese and Indian forces engage in a military clash when Indian forces arrive with bulldozers and halt the construction of a road by China in Doklam.

## Questions A Resolution Must Answer

- How can China and India be brought to the negotiating table to discuss the demarcation of the boundary?
- Where should the final boundaries be drawn? What are the arguments for drawing the borders in this manner?
- What measures can be taken to avoid the skirmishes between the Indian and Chinese armed forces which occur on an almost daily basis?
- How can the human rights violations in the border regions, particularly by China near the Tibetan border and India under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act be addressed?
- How can the demilitarization of these regions be achieved in light of the spiraling security dilemma?

## Conclusion

This background guide might have hit you with a lot of information, but it has only scratched the surface of two extremely complex topics. I thoroughly enjoyed reading and writing about these topics but I can't wait to hear actual debate on the issues. Drive committee in whatever direction you want. Be creative with the arguments you present- the dais will be listening. What we are looking for is well-researched speeches which demonstrate an understanding of the topics, creativity in dealing with crises, and an ability to lead committee in the direction you want to take. Most importantly, though, we want this committee to be fun. We want to hear different perspectives and see collaboration. Write a crazy joint crisis note with someone who comes from a different continent; voice your agreement (or disagreement) with you've never met before and might never meet again; send a rose to that delegate who vetoed your last directive. It's not often that you get the chance to interact with people that have such vastly different backgrounds and that is the most exciting thing that CHMUN has to offer you as a conference. Remember, everything you do should appear to be in the interest of the UNSC and international security. We can't wait for committee!



## Endnotes

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